Habitability laws for rental housing: the impact of tenant inputs
Language: English Series: Urban Studies ; 29(1) February 1992, 15-24(6)Publication details: 1992Subject(s): Summary: Develops a simple model of the housing rental relationship capturing the impact which both landlord and tenant have on housing quality. It shows that, because of the moral hazard problem, the non co-operative equilibrium of the model is inefficient in that, in the absence of any regulation, both parties invest too little in maintaining the quality of the unit. The model, assessing the relationship between the two parties, indicates that (i) increased landlord maintenance raises tenant utility and lowers landlord profits, (ii) the joint benefits of landlords and tenants first rise and then falls greater maintenance is required, and (iii) housing quality varies ambiguously with landlord maintenance, given that increased miantenance is met with reduced tenant input. (Journal abstract)| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal article | London Journal article | X1148 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Available | 14971-1001 |
Develops a simple model of the housing rental relationship capturing the impact which both landlord and tenant have on housing quality. It shows that, because of the moral hazard problem, the non co-operative equilibrium of the model is inefficient in that, in the absence of any regulation, both parties invest too little in maintaining the quality of the unit. The model, assessing the relationship between the two parties, indicates that (i) increased landlord maintenance raises tenant utility and lowers landlord profits, (ii) the joint benefits of landlords and tenants first rise and then falls greater maintenance is required, and (iii) housing quality varies ambiguously with landlord maintenance, given that increased miantenance is met with reduced tenant input. (Journal abstract)