[2006] EWHC 174 TCC, 2 February 2006. Q applied to enforce an adjudicator's decision made against V under a contract providing for adjudication in accordance with the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996. V had made two unsuccessful applications by letter to the architect for an extension of time, and then gave notice of adjudication. The adjudicator found that V had failed to establish that it was entitled to an extension of time. In a subsequent adjudication commenced by Q, Q relied upon the adjudicator's first decision to demonstrate that V was not entitled to an extension of time. V argued that the adjudicator had erred in treating his own decision in the first adjudication as conclusive in relation to extension of time. "Held" (1) where the contract permitted the contractor to make successive applications for extension of time on different grounds, either party could refer those matters to successive adjudications; (2) if the contractor made successive applications on the same grounds and the architect/contract administrator reiterated his original decision, the aggrieved party was debarred from referring that matter to successive adjudications by the Act and the Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998; (3) where a contractor was resisting a claim for liquidated and ascertained damages in respect of delay in adjudication proceedings, the contractor could raise as a defence his entitlement to an extension of time, he could not rely by way of defence in adjudication proceedings upon an alleged entitlement to an extension of time that had been considered and rejected in a previous adjudication. In this case, the disputes in the two adjudications related to different matters, so that in the second adjudication V had been entitled to advance any available defence. V's defence was that it was entitled to an extension of time in respect of the entire period; its case for such an extension in the second adjudication was substantially different from the claims for extension that had been considered and rejected in the first adjudication. Therefore, the adjudicator ought to have considered V's defence, and by not doing so, had failed to abide by the rules of natural justice.