RHJ Ltd v FT Patten (Holdings) Ltd and another [electronic resource]
Language: English Publication details: 2008Subject(s): Online resources: Summary: [2008] EWCA Civ 151, 12 March 2008. Considered whether a clause in a lease excluding the acquiring of easements under the Prescription Act 1832 had to refer specifically to the right to light in order for that right to be deemed excluded. The appellant lessee (R) appealed against a preliminary finding (L139811) that the right to light did not have to be specifically mentioned in his lease among easements which were barred to him. The lease allowed the respondent landlord (F) to construct adjacent to the property and the judge ruled on this preliminary issue that it had not been intended to grant the indefeasible right of light to R. R appealed, arguing that to bar that right for the purpose of section 3 of the Act, the clause had to make it clear that the right to light specifically was consensual. "Held": The phrase "expressly made or given for that purpose" in section 3 of the Act was satisfied by a condition in the lease which had the effect of rendering all easements conditional or permissive. There was no requirement to expressly refer to the right of light. The judge had been correct in his findings. Appeal dismissed.| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Law report | Virtual Online | ONLINE PUBLICATION (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Available | 143458-1001 |
[2008] EWCA Civ 151, 12 March 2008. Considered whether a clause in a lease excluding the acquiring of easements under the Prescription Act 1832 had to refer specifically to the right to light in order for that right to be deemed excluded. The appellant lessee (R) appealed against a preliminary finding (L139811) that the right to light did not have to be specifically mentioned in his lease among easements which were barred to him. The lease allowed the respondent landlord (F) to construct adjacent to the property and the judge ruled on this preliminary issue that it had not been intended to grant the indefeasible right of light to R. R appealed, arguing that to bar that right for the purpose of section 3 of the Act, the clause had to make it clear that the right to light specifically was consensual. "Held": The phrase "expressly made or given for that purpose" in section 3 of the Act was satisfied by a condition in the lease which had the effect of rendering all easements conditional or permissive. There was no requirement to expressly refer to the right of light. The judge had been correct in his findings. Appeal dismissed.