000			01337cab a2200217 4500
001			X1148
008			090401t1992 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
035			_a(Sirsi) u14971
041			_aeng
100			_aMiceli, T.J.
245			_aHabitability laws for rental housing: the impact of tenant inputs
260			_c1992
350			_a0
490			_aUrban Studies _v29(1) February 1992, 15-24(6)
520			_aDevelops a simple model of the housing rental relationship capturing the impact which both landlord and tenant have on housing quality. It shows that, because of the moral hazard problem, the non co-operative equilibrium of the model is inefficient in that, in the absence of any regulation, both parties invest too little in maintaining the quality of the unit. The model, assessing the relationship between the two parties, indicates that (i) increased landlord maintenance raises tenant utility and lowers landlord profits, (ii) the joint benefits of landlords and tenants first rise and then falls greater maintenance is required, and (iii) housing quality varies ambiguously with landlord maintenance, given that increased miantenance is met with reduced tenant input. (Journal abstract)
650			_aLANDLORD AND TENANT _96252
650			_aRENTED HOUSING
690			_aHOUSING
942			_n0
948			_c04/03/1997
999			_c9776 _d9776